On symbolic victories – Harel in Haaretz:

‘As the fighting drags on and grows more complicated, Israel will increasingly focus on the need to hit Sinwar. There is a great deal of symbolism involved, as Sinwar was the planner and executioner of the October 7 massacre. But there is also a practical reason to target him, as he was the one who steered Hamas into its ultra-militant policy toward Israel. The idea is that if Sinwar and perhaps his immediate circle are removed, the organization will lose the will to continue the fight.
However, the path toward this goal is not clear. Moreover, Israel has a tradition of seeking symbolic “images of victory” that usually don’t lead to an actual victory.
This problem is compounded by Netanyahu’s stubborn refusal to discuss with the Americans what will happen in the Gaza Strip the day after Hamas’ defeat (which in any event isn’t necessarily going to be achieved) and his insistence that the Palestinian Authority will not be part of the solution. The Biden administration is trying to circumvent the problem by discussing the changes that the Palestinian Authority will undergo, but the differences are not semantic.’

(…)
‘The absence of a clear strategic goal for the war means the army lacks clarity, it makes it difficult to coordinate closely with the U.S. and may further erode international patience.’ (…)

‘The most dramatic development in the region has to do with events in Yemen, where the Houthis are increasing their attacks on maritime traffic in the Arabian and Red seas. This is no longer solely an Israeli problem. The drone and missile attacks may have been directed at ships indirectly or partly owned by Israelis, but have already damaged other ships, and were directed at the American task force as well. The Zim shipping company has already announced a change of route for its ships sailing from the Far East to Israel, circumnavigating Africa. The Houthi harassment may disrupt traffic in the Suez Canal, increase shipping costs and commensurately increase the cost of imports to many countries.
This is becoming an America problem, and at some point the U.S. will have to overcome its reservations and risk a direct confrontation with the Houthis – a stubborn, extremist opponent whom it is hard to scare with more suffering, since Yemen is already at the bottom of every global index. This could be a job for an international coalition. Meanwhile, it’s time that the U.S. and its allies also address the entity funding and maintaining the Houthis and Hezbollah without paying any price: Iran.’

Read the article here.

Netanyahu is part of the problem, and so are those willing to adhere to his mistaken strategy, which are quite a few. Understandably so, maybe, it seemed to have worked for many Israelis, for a while.
And symbolic victories are rarely real victories.

Heel stated earlier that probably before Christmas Biden's patience will be exhausted.

Hamas is a symbol itself, and will survive most probably, even if the entire leadership will be killed. ‘Hamas is a brand name, not a list of individuals and objects.’ (Hussein Ibish) See here.
As to Iran and Yemen. At a certain point the US will get involved, but it would like to postpone the direct fighting as much as possible.

After all, in 2024 there will be elections. And the disaster of the return of Mr. Trump remains a possibility.

Foreign policy will be more and more dictated by the strategies to win the '24 elections.