On a deadly game of poker - Zvi Bar'el in Haaretz:

‘In an interview with the Saudi website Al Arabiya Al Hadath, Badran said that "Israel hasn't succeeded in freeing even a single hostage by force, and the movement won't agree to any temporary cease-fires. But it will agree to conduct negotiations after the attacks have stopped."
Hamas rejected Israel's proposal for a seven-day cease-fire in exchange for the release of 35 hostages. But even though the negotiations seem to be at an impasse, an Islamic Jihad delegation headed by the movement's leader, Ziad al-Nakhalah, is expected to arrive in Egypt this week to explore other options.’

(…)

‘Israel's view is that freeing the hostages depends on exerting powerful military pressure, which will achieve two goals at once. But Hamas seeks a situation in which continued military action on any scale will merely frustrate the achievement of Israel's goal of freeing the hostages, and Israel will therefore have to give up its ambition of destroying more of Hamas' infrastructure if it wants to get its hostages back.
In the previous deal, Hamas conducted negotiations via Qatari and Egyptian mediators on a tactical level – that is, a defined number of cease-fire days and the provision of humanitarian aid, including fuel, in exchange for the release of a defined list of hostages. Now, it apparently views the hostages as strategic bargaining chips.’

(…)
‘While these leaders stress that there are "no divisions" between Hamas' military wing and its political one, the rules of the game are being set by Hamas' leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, based on his reading of the situation in the field and his assessment of Hamas' military capabilities for continuing the war. And there's no guarantee that these are identical to the way Hamas' leadership outside Gaza sees things.
Thus, a parallel set of negotiations has developed in which Hamas' external leadership is discussing the movement's political future. Its senior members are holding talks with senior members of the Palestinian Authority's ruling Fatah party about the terms for Hamas joining the PLO and creating a unified governing authority, even without holding elections. These negotiations are based on Hamas' public support, which is evident not only in opinion polls, but also in the statements of Fatah leaders. Almost without exception, they say that Hamas has been and will remain an integral part of the Palestinian governing structure.’

(…)

‘In the past, Hamas demanded roughly half the ministers in any Palestinian government and a similar share of other senior positions and budgets. It also demanded at least 40 percent of the seats on PLO executive bodies should it join that organization.
But Hamas' current leaders – some of whom claim that they weren't even informed of, much less party to, the decision made in Gaza to go to war against Israel – have now discovered that their political future and the cards they have to play against Fatah are dependent on Sinwar's behavior. In particular, they are dependent on his success or failure in turning the hostage issue into an achievement for himself and for Hamas as a whole.’

(…)

‘Sinwar's demand, and that of Hamas as a whole, for a cease-fire – not for a week or two, but a permanent one – shows that he sees the hostages as guarantees not only of his physical survival, but also of the organization's future, which is now in his hands. And it would be better not even to imagine what he might do to them if he concludes that he no longer has anything to fight for, or that the hostages aren't doing the job he has assigned them.’

Read the article here

On October 13 I wrote that Hamas has already won this war. See here, only in Dutch.

That’s I would say still the case. The price was steep but according to Sinwar it was worth it.
This was made possible also by strategic and political failures by Israel, and the hubris of the military was of course affected by the hubris and cynicism of Israeli politicians (and electorate), which runs much deeper than Netanyahu. Netanyahu is just the symptom of a process of rotting.

The impossibility of liberating hostages – except for one female soldier – by force is a boost to Sinwar.
But to a certain extent the organization of Hamas has become Sinwar’s hostage as well.
The big question is when Hamas outside Gaza reaches the conclusion that Sinwar has become a liability, and he needs to be disposed of.

That’s the gamble of the coming weeks.

Would Hamas post-Sinwar be more interested in a long-term deal with Israel? I remain skeptical.

Anything that smells like peace is deadly for Hamas, and also for the messianic zealots in Israel.

The revolution should be permanent, likewise the violence.