On inevitability - Alon Pinkas in Haaretz:

‘The current discourse on the likelihood, inevitability and scope of an Israeli-Hezbollah conflagration is somewhat misleading. This is not just about an unresolved territorial dispute in Lebanon or Hezbollah's constant harassment and attacks. This is more about a broader war with Iran – and this is the critical point where U.S. and Israeli intelligence assessments and geopolitical policy preferences significantly diverge.
More importantly, as far as the United States is concerned, this is a conflict configured with very different and far more explosive geopolitical and strategic aspects, with both China and Russia supporting the Shi'ite Muslim organization (albeit in different ways).’

(…)

‘Immediately after the Hamas attack on October 7, the United States identified preventing escalation with Hezbollah in Lebanon, and with Iran throughout the region, as a prime interest. Biden referred to this in his October 10 White House speech and, toward that end, dispatched two aircraft carrier strike force groups to the region.’

(…)

‘In October and into November, the Americans were concerned that Hezbollah or Israel would initiate an escalation. As early as October 11, the Biden administration pushed back forcefully against Israeli ideas of a preemptive strike on Hezbollah. By early December, the sense in Washington was that the skirmishes across the Israel-Lebanon border were contained and that further escalation was a low probability. A month later, that assessment is being critically revisited and "escalation" – the word of the month for October – is making a dangerous comeback.’ (…)

‘In reality, though, the current tensions and escalation are part of a much broader context: Hezbollah serves as an Iranian deterrent against possible Israeli attacks on Iran, and a central component of a web of Iranian proxies destabilizing the region.
An Israeli-Hezbollah war could be devastating for both sides. Despite Israel's vastly superior military, Hezbollah's precise missile arsenal presents an equalizer of sorts. The group is believed to have approximately 150,000 missiles and rockets, with up to 20,000 of them being GPS-guided precision missiles with a range of 250 to 300 kilometers, capable of carrying 450 to 500 kilograms of high explosive warheads. Unlike Gaza, which is an encircled enclave, Lebanon has long borders with Syria (which in turn has long borders with Iraq and Turkey), ensuring the passage of arms and fighters.’

(…)

‘ The February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine extricated Iran from its relative isolation. First had come the reckless decision in May 2018 by then-President Donald Trump, encouraged by Netanyahu, to unilaterally withdraw from the nuclear deal (aka the JCPOA). Iran then accelerated its nuclear program and is now a nuclear threshold state, weeks away from weapons-grade enriched uranium and a year away from producing weapons.’

(…)

‘The war in Gaza has become an ongoing military operation, lacking political objectives, missing a strategic grand design and devoid of an alignment between the military means and the diplomatic goals. That is why, by definition, it cannot end in a "victory image," such as Appomattox Court House in 1865, the American flag hoisted by troops in Iwo Jima and the Soviet flag atop the German Reichstag in 1945, or Moshe Dayan walking into Jerusalem's Old City in 1967.’

(…)

‘If the political goal is a diplomatic solution, the question is why not try it before or instead of a war. Then again, this is the Middle East.’

Read the article here.

A few preliminary conclusions (and most conclusions are preliminary):

Iran is one of the winners of the war in Ukraine.

The war in Gaza is a quagmire, regardless what the IDF will achieve. Perhaps if the IDF will manage to rescue all the hostages this will change the equilibrium. But it seems to be unlikely.

Compared to the war between Hezbollah and Israel Gaza will look like small beer, the devastation and the number of victims will be enormous. Deterioration is the only hope and it worked since 2006, but no guarantee that suddenly it won’t work anymore.

The US withdrew some of the ships in the Mediterranean but this doesn’t mean that the US can remain on the sidelines when the regional war is a fact.

Then again, this is the Middle East reminded me of Polanski’s movie ‘Chinatown’: ‘Forget it Jake. It’s Chinatown.’