On deterrence and other disasters – Uri Bar-Joseph in Haaretz:

‘The first involved reliance on deterrence, which in essence makes use of a military threat so as to prevent the adversary from trying to alter the status quo unilaterally. In ancient times, this approach was encapsulated in the Roman dictum, "If you want peace, prepare for war." Deterrence also became the dominant strategy of the two superpowers in the nuclear era of the 20th century. In the Israeli context, a cumulative component was added to deterrence: repeatedly defeating the enemy until it was persuaded that it lacked the ability to vanquish Israel, at which point the enemy would turn to diplomacy to end the conflict. Effective deterrence must rest, then, on achieving victory in every confrontation and at whatever level of intensity it takes. Victory entails not only a successful defensive battle but also punishment of the aggressor.
The second basic element of the security concept is high-quality strategic deterrence, to enable an orderly mobilization of the Israel Defense Forces and their deployment for war. Strategic deterrence is an important layer in the security concept of every country, but Israel's demographic inferiority relative to the Arab states, which obligated it to rely on the reserve army in wartime, together with its lack of strategic depth, rendered it an extremely critical element of the security concept and made the intelligence community a central factor in the security of the state from its earliest days.’

(…)

‘The golden era of this security concept was the period between the Sinai War and the Six-Day War. The conquest of the Sinai peninsula in 1956 proved to Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser that his army was not yet prepared to take on the IDF, and that much more time would be needed to achieve that capability. Egypt's entanglement in the civil war in Yemen hampered its force building even more, and the clashes between the IDF and the Syrian and Jordanian armies in the period prior to the Six-Day War demonstrated clearly Israel's military superiority.
Accordingly, despite the pan-Arab policy that posited Israel's elimination as a declared central goal, Nasser ensured that the border remained quiet and recoiled from all military activity – until his army entered Sinai in mid-May 1967. Even then, according to everything we know today, he resisted going to war and certainly did not intend to have Egypt initiate a war.’

(…)

‘In the atmosphere of self-confidence created by the war's results, not enough attention was paid to the fact that a dramatic change had been engendered in the basic conditions that the security concept had addressed. Until then, the price demanded for any attempt to reach a political settlement entailed major concessions that were perceived by Israel as impossible to agree to. For example, the Alpha Plan, initiated by the United States and Britain in 1955, called for Israel to cede extensive areas in the Negev and to absorb 75,000 refugees in return for the Arab states' termination of the state of belligerency. The initiative was categorically rejected by the government of David Ben-Gurion and was spurned by the Arab states as well.
However, the conquest of the territories in 1967 gave Israel a bargaining chip with which a political settlement could have been achieved while preserving its territorial integrity and without absorbing a large number of Arab refugees. The most direct expression of this was UN Security Council Resolution 242, of November 1967, which in essence called for the termination of the state of war in exchange for Israel returning the territories it conquered in the war. This concept of a settlement has remained the only one accepted within the international arena to this day.’ (…)

‘What followed were the seven most difficult security years in Israel's history. Deterrence failed twice: in March 1969, when Egypt launched what would become known as the War of Attrition, and in October 1973. Early warning failed shamefully with the eruption of war on October 6, 1973, and no decisive blow was struck either in the War of Attrition or in the Yom Kippur War. These failures exacted a steep price. If in the 10 years of quiet Israel lost fewer than 200 civilians and soldiers in hostile operations, in the seven years between June 1967 and May 1974, the years in which "our security situation was never better," Israel sustained the loss of about 5,000 soldiers and civilians.’ (…)

‘The war that started on October 7 provided the clearest expression of the bankruptcy of the concept that continues to rely on deterrence, early warning and delivery of a decisive blow. Hamas was not deterred, and inflicted on strong and confident Israel the most painful blow in its history. No early warning was provided, and Military Intelligence thereby was left with a perfect record of major failures – two out of two, within 50 years and a day. And as for the IDF's ability to deliver a decisive blow against a semi-military organization that is not in possession of heavy weapons – we have seen how well that works in the form of an intense war that has lasted for more than three months and whose end is not visible on the horizon.’ (…)

‘One answer is the superpower support of the United States, without which – as every prime minister since Ben-Gurion has understood – Israel must avoid entering into a major war. The American strategic prop, which has become increasingly solid since the mid-1960s, bears central importance – but the events of the past few months show that it too has limit. Even when the most pro-Israel administration asserts itself unequivocally in the arena – dispatches forces to the region, organizes an airlift, intercepts drones and diverts precious resources from the war in Ukraine in favor of Israel's defense – the IDF is finding it difficult to deliver a decisive blow to Hamas. Israel cannot fight without the support of the United States, but that support is not enough.’

(…)

‘The Syrian story could have been the same. After the Yom Kippur War, Syrian President Hafez Assad proposed the termination of the conflict in return for a full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. The same formula was reprised as well in contacts with the second Rabin government, the first Netanyahu government, and the government of Ehud Barak. The Israeli tendency to attribute the failures of the negotiations to Syria's obduracy and its unreasonable demands is not credible.
Uri Sagi, who was one of the most skilled and successful army officers in Israel's history, and who led the talks with Syria under Ehud Barak, thought that an agreement was within reach, but Israel backtracked and therefore it was not achieved. In the end, Barak, too, like his predecessors, opted out of signing an agreement for fear of the opposition of the Israeli public to a withdrawal from the Golan Heights, and not because of security considerations.’

(…)

‘ It's difficult to find even a single person among ranking personnel in the IDF, the Shin Bet security service or the Mossad who will argue that the settlements provide security. Even the settlements' most avowed supporters have ceased to invoke concrete security rationales, and are placing their trust mainly in God. One can be for settlements or against them, but there is no doubt that from the security point of view they are a disaster.’

(…)

‘Here we return to the essence. The Israeli security concept that for 75 years relied on military superiority alone is bankrupt. What's missing is the political component, whose role would be to reduce our enemies' motivation to go to war against us and thus to lighten the load that weighs on the familiar trinity of deterrence-early warning-decisive blow. Without that development, as experience since 1967 has shown repeatedly, deterrence will fail, early warning will not meet the test and the IDF will find it difficult to inflict the decisive blow. And thus, despite its constantly increasing military might, Israel will fail to attain the security it seeks.’

Read the article here.

A military solution without a political solution is impossible.
The settlements are a disaster, for all people involved.

Of course, any political solution can be interrupted by violence that remains very effective tool to frighten and radicalize a population.
See the extreme-right and terrorist attacks in Europe.

But the alternatives are far worse. Perhaps the enlightened people will heed this warning, but I’m afraid that zealotism is (too) far spread in many societies, also in this one.