On a hell in the making – Joost Hiltermann in NYRB:

‘Since October 7 the country has been determined to recover its shattered sense of security. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been able to delay a domestic reckoning about the intelligence and security failures that occurred that day, but only for now. He may believe that he can only salvage his political career by dealing decisive blows not only to Hamas but also to Iran and its allies, especially Hezbollah, lest there be a reprise, sooner or later, of the dread day. He may also believe, as he has intimated in recent speeches, that he can effect regime change both in Lebanon and in Iran, thus removing one of Israel’s main threats—Iran’s nuclear program. The Biden administration may not be encouraging Netanyahu to proceed on that path, but he knows that the US will not let Israel down.’

(…)

‘In the months leading up to October 7, Hamas was under growing pressure in Gaza. In 2006 it had won the Palestinian parliamentary elections, and the next year it began governing the territory, at which point Israel put the enclave under a long-term blockade. Through its control of Gaza’s borders and skies, Israel further restricted the population’s freedom of movement and its access to essential goods, creating what humanitarian workers called the world’s largest open-air prison. During these years Hamas fought Israel on several occasions, with the military support of Iran and Hezbollah. Meanwhile repeated Israeli bombardments made the Strip increasingly unlivable. Squeezed by the blockade, growing numbers of Gazans grew disaffected with a militant group that could not alleviate their suffering. In 2019 people started taking to the streets to protest worsening living conditions in what they called the “We Want to Live” movement. Hamas suppressed the demonstrations and arrested protesters.
Hamas is an awkward partner in the axis of resistance. The group’s ideology, grounded in both Sunni Islam and Palestinian resistance to Israel’s occupation, markedly differs from that of Iran and its other nonstate associates, which are confessionally Shia and have a political affinity with the leadership that emerged from the 1979 Islamic revolution. By forming the axis, Iran sent a clear message to the US and Israel: attack us and you risk a multifront war. As I argued earlier this year, Iran meant for its allies to harass their common enemies, serving as a kind of forward defense—not for them to pursue their domestic interests if doing so might harm its own strategic aims.’

(…)

‘None of these tit-for-tat attacks disturbed the overall balance of mutual deterrence. Since both sides appeared reluctant to escalate beyond a certain level, Israel was free to pursue its war against Hamas, which amounted to a collective punishment of Gaza, without significant restraint. The Israeli military has leveled the strip’s infrastructure and housing; killed over 42,000 people, with thousands more thought to be buried under the ruble; and displaced almost the entire population—70 percent of whom are refugees from the 1948 nakba or their descendants—to ever smaller “safe” areas that it has also attacked, invariably on the accusation that Hamas had bases in these civilian enclaves.’

(…)

‘So far, that reasoning appears to have been validated. On October 1, in retaliation for the killings of Haniyeh, Nasrallah, and senior Hezbollah commanders, Iran attacked Israel again, this time firing a volley of some 180 mainly ballistic missiles. Because Israel and the US had less time to prepare, a number of the missiles penetrated Israel’s defenses, striking two airbases and a site close to the headquarters of its spy agency, the Mossad. But Israeli accounts suggest the damage was limited. There was one casualty: a Palestinian man in the occupied West Bank was hit by the debris of a missile that was successfully intercepted in the skies above.
By targeting military sites, Iran was still signaling restraint and a desire to end things there. Yet the spiral toward full-scale war may have its own inexorable logic. Escalation begets escalation when neither side can afford to stand down. The Iranian leadership had come under harsh criticism before October 1 for looking weak, both at home and from its nonstate allies in the region. The Israeli public, shocked by the October 1 barrage, stood fully behind its leaders when they vowed revenge and may not mince their words if their government exacts none.’

(…)

‘It did not have to go this way. The US’s contribution to the present crisis, in particular, demands close scrutiny. After October 7 the Biden administration sent its diplomats into the region to keep things calm, while at the same time dispatching warships to deter Iran and Hezbollah from launching an all-out attack on Israel. That display of military power might, in turn, have emboldened Netanyahu, who repeatedly undermined US attempts to mediate a cease-fire in Gaza and most recently Lebanon. All along, perhaps worried about losing domestic support, Biden did not meaningfully pressure Netanyahu to settle for a diplomatic solution. Whoever wins next month’s elections, the region is turning into a hell from which the US will have trouble escaping.’

Read the article here.

In other words, the US miscalculated – what was meant to produce de-escalation and a cease-fire produced escalation.

The logic of restoring deterrence produces also escalation.

Still, as Hiltermann argues, the axis of resistance is meant to be a forward defense, the situation in Lebanon or is for the powers that be in Iran just an afterthought.

Betting on the continuation of the status can be risky.

Meaningful pressure on Netanyahu might come too late, or just in time.

The logic of restoring deterrence is illogical.