On Russia – Mathieu von Rohr in Der Spiegel:

‘It is all the more disconcerting because Germany, as the most important member state in the European Union, should be playing a key role in the standoff. But it is far from living up to that responsibility. Russia is threatening war against Ukraine, and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s response has been a vague threat of "consequences" should Moscow decide to invade. What kind of consequences? He hasn’t said.
The reason for the tentative approach is clear: The tri-party coalition government of Scholz’s Social Democrats (SPD), the business-friendly Free Democrats (FDP) and the Greens hasn’t come to an agreement on what sort of punitive measures might be deployed. And in such a grave situation as the one developing on Ukraine’s eastern border, that is a catastrophe.’

(…)

‘Russia is demanding that all NATO troops be withdrawn from alliance member states in Eastern Europe and it wants a guarantee that the neighboring Scandinavian countries of Finland and Sweden will never join the alliance. Last week, representatives from the U.S. and Russia met in Geneva for talks, but afterwards, Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov wasn’t interested in further negotiations because the Americans and NATO weren’t inclined to meet the entire catalog of Moscow’s maximalist demands.
Despite this alarming global political crisis, the German government has been surprisingly reserved in its comments. Chancellor Scholz has been notably reticent and over-reliant on formulaic banalities. The government has emphasized that it would act in concert with the EU and NATO if Russia were to launch an attack, but Berlin hasn’t even been able to promise that it would put a stop to the Baltic Sea gas pipeline, Nord Stream 2, in the event of war. The pipeline has long been extremely controversial because it would allow for the direct delivery of natural gas from Russia and Germany, circumventing both Ukraine and Poland. Berlin apparently continues to think it conceivable that gas will ultimately flow through the pipeline – even if Russia attacks Ukraine. What, then, is the value of all the talk of "consequences"?’

(…)

‘Indeed, with Germany looking weak and divided, Moscow can feel emboldened in its current course. Especially given that there are prominent apologists for Russia’s aggressive policies within the governing coalition.
The greatest handicap for Germany’s foreign policy is currently Chancellor Scholz’s SPD. Large swaths of the party, as the current crisis has laid bare, continue to be mired in nostalgia when it comes to their approach to Moscow – a wistfulness that one might be more likely to associate with the Left Party. On Germany’s far left, admiration of authoritarian regimes is standard: The U.S., they tend to believe, is evil, while Russia isn’t considered to be all that bad.’

(…)

‘SPD General Secretary Kevin Kühnert even went so far as to say that one should be careful not to "fuel" potential international crises through overwrought rhetoric. Kühnert claimed that such rhetoric was aimed at putting an end to certain projects that "have always been a thorn in the side." He was talking about Nord Stream 2, the pipeline of which the Green Party – the SPD’s coalition partner – has been skeptical for years. The debate over Nord Stream 2 and Russia’s approach to Ukraine should not be mixed, Kühnert said.’

(…)

‘It is difficult to understand why so many SPD members insist on excluding this pipeline project from possible sanctions – a project that has already served to isolate Germany within the Western alliance for the past several years.
Does it perhaps have to do with the fact that the pipeline’s origins are directly connected to the SPD, particularly with Gerhard Schröder, the last SPD chancellor of Germany? Shortly before he was voted out of office, Schröder agreed to the deal for the first Nord Stream pipeline with Russian President Vladimir Putin – and then immediately became chairman of the board of the company operating the pipeline after he left office. He is now also chairman of the board of directors of the Russian oil company Rosneft. Part of the problem is that many within the SPD, and in Germany at large, continue to see Schröder as a completely normal ex-chancellor and as an elder statesman. In fact, though, he is a nothing other than a paid lobbyist on Moscow’s payroll.’

(…)

‘During the campaign, Scholz claimed that if he was chosen to lead Germany, whoever ordered leadership from him would also get it. If that is the case, then it is high time for him to find clear words for Moscow, particularly given the mixed messages and appeasement rhetoric coming from his own party. Scholz is not a member of the pro-Russia wing in his party, but he too has frequently repeated the untruth that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is "purely a private economic venture." It is very hard to believe that Scholz doesn’t recognize the political dimensions of this project.’

(…)
‘Above all, though, it’s time for the SPD to give itself a reality check. In Germany's left-wing circles, the word "warmonger” remains popular vocabulary for discrediting anyone calling for an economic, military and political strategy in the face of Russia’s destabilizing and bellicose intentions. In those circles, anything Russia does is never half as bad as what the U.S. or Europe does to ensure their security.
But there can be no doubt these days about just who is the true warmonger and wager of wars. It is imperative that this fact is recognized not only that the German government and particularly the chancellor’s party, the SPD, but also that they act accordingly.’

Read the article here.

I tend to agree with Mathieu von Rohr. There comes that weaknesses and divisions are so obvious that it would rather stupid for Putin to miss this opportunity.

The Netherlands appears to be occupied with scandals at a popular television show, nothing better than the combination of celebrities and sex, and elsewhere Covid is very much on the foreground elsewhere.

The NYT reported that the divisions within NATO (old news) are there for everybody to see. Biden just stated the obvious. Well, there are even divisions within the German government. Europe has almost given up on Ukraine. (Read it here.)

Ukraine is not Sudetenland, 2022 is not 1938, and even though I’m a fan of laissez-faire, laisses-faire vis-a-vis Putin is not right strategy.

I fully understand the reluctance to anything that might resemble warmongering, but the delight with which Europe takes a bath in its own powerlessness is telling. Ready for nothingness.