On war and its positive side – By Dirk Kurbjuweit and Ralf Neukirch in Der Spiegel:

‘Could this war actually be an opportunity? There is every reason - rooted in both reason and emotion - to reject that view. And yet, it has happened time and again. Wars are game changers; they transform a huge number of things. First and foremost, of course, they turn people's everyday lives into nightmares, but politically, the occasional positive effect can result. Is the European Union one of those cases?’

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‘Reconciling that which Europeans share with that which sets them apart – embodied in the national – has been the grand Europe mission since the end of World War II. Germany, in particular, has long been an advocate of the common, expressed by the concept of an "ever closer union," an aim proclaimed in the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The ultimate goal is that of a federalist state, sovereign both internally and externally. The current government in Berlin explicitly backs that goal.

In truth, however, the European Union is far from that vision. Sovereignty continues to lie primarily with the nation states, and they are eager to preserve that which sets them apart, particularly the newer members in Eastern Europe. And in Western Europe, the rise of populist political parties and the refocus on national interests that took place during the euro and refugee crises weakened the trend toward the common. The utopia of an internally sovereign Europe is no longer as potent as it once was.’

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‘The Europeans have left their protection to NATO, which may be largely made up of European nation states, but is worth little without the U.S. "NATO can't defend Europe without the conventional and nuclear contributions from the U.S. and its political leadership," Major says.’

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‘To truly break away from its reliance on the U.S., Europe would also need a strong nuclear arsenal of its own. Establishing such a deterrent would also likely take decades. If, that is, such a development is even possible, given the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty and the widespread resistance to be expected in numerous member states.
What to do? Major proposes that the EU and NATO be better interlinked and, at the same time, that the armies of the EU member states be upgraded, primarily conventionally, with tanks and helicopters. She says, though, that it must be done in a more coordinated way that before, by way of specialization, for example. If the Czechs have already developed significant capabilities on atomic, biological and chemical (ABC) weapons defense, then there's no need for Slovakia to develop its own ABC defense capabilities, she says. Armament projects free of nation-state egoism would be an important step forward, Major argues.
"The trick for the Europeans," Major says, "will be to gradually increase military capability without making the U.S. feel like we don't need them anymore." It will be a balancing act. In the best case, the two sides will remain close partners: a militarily strengthened EU with the U.S. "If we Europeans become stronger, we will also grow more attractive to the United States as a partner," says Major.’

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‘Cuperus accuses the Germans of projecting their trauma onto the EU, especially "their totally distorted, poisoned relationship with their own nation." Understandably, he writes in his book, Germans suffered from "post-traumatic stress syndrome" in light of the terrible years from 1933 to 1945. But other European countries came out of that war with a different "mindset," he argues, and didn't want to abolish their national consciousness.
Cuperus rejects Utopia I, a sovereign federal state of Europe. He sees a danger that it could become "a kind of enlarged Federal Republic of Germany, only with additional states."
He argues that the EU should strengthen its common foreign and security policy by abandoning unanimity in that area and allowing majority decisions – in other words, Utopia II. But Cuperus' deep-seated distrust of the Germans limits his desire for greater strategic autonomy for the EU. Without the Americans, he fears, Germany would be too strong. And that would result in an "asymmetry of power" in Europe.’

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‘Developments have shown that his concern is not unfounded. Governing parties in both Poland and Hungary are critical of the EU. In the first round of voting in the French presidential election, anti-European parties from the left and the right received more than 50 percent of the vote. There are risks involved if European unification becomes a bureaucratic project.
But who ultimately decides whether the path to a federal state is legally correct? For the EU institutions, the matter is clear. "The last word on EU law is always spoken in Luxembourg and nowhere else," says European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, referring to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). She says the same law must apply in all member states.
Vosskuhle also holds such a view, in principle. But for him, the crucial question is a different one. Who is checking to see whether the European Central Bank is usurping a competency that Germany's parliament did not confer to it? Can the ECJ rule on whether Germany has transferred competencies to the EU? Germany's Constitutional Court gave that answer under Vosskuhle's leadership two years ago. For the first time, the court ruled that a judgment of the ECJ was invalid because it had exceeded its powers. "National constitutional courts must help monitor the progress of European integration as long as there is no European federal state," Vosskuhle says.
The ECJ as the driver of integration and the Federal Constitutional Court as the guardian of democracy is a dispute that cannot be decided. The power of the judges in Karlsrule won't end until Germany is absorbed into a federal state of Europe. He says the Germans would have to vote on that absorption in a referendum. Whether everything remains above board until that point will be decided by the judges at the German high court.
The German historian Heinrich August Winkler also sees no basis for an internal sovereignty within the European Union. "There can be no sovereignty beyond popular sovereignty," he says. That would require a complete legitimization of European politics through the parliament in Strasbourg. And that isn't even close to existing, he says. Not even the basic rule of "one man, one vote" applies, since an electoral vote from Malta carries 10 times more weight at the European level than one from Germany.
Winkler wrote a sympathetic review of Cuperus' book. But he also stresses that a more closely interlinked foreign and security policy must also have parliamentary legitimacy. And the only way to do that is through the member states. But even "the individual members states are no longer classic, fully sovereign nation states," Winkler says. They have already ceded too many competencies to Brussels, he argues. Plus, they are no longer able to project power on their own. Against Putin's Russia, for example.’

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‘And how do you reconcile the main contradiction between integration and democracy? Krastev points out that many liberal intellectuals view democracy as a threat to Europe. Democracy, after all, could destroy the EU if citizens elect anti-European governments. Or if they vote against European projects in referendums, as has happened in France, Denmark and the Netherlands. In Greece, the population voted against the austerity package imposed by Brussels during the euro and debt crisis. But the EU still forced the Greek government to comply with its conditions.
So, what is more important: Europe or democracy? For Krastev, the answer lies in political practice. For him, Europe is a place of negotiation. The EU, he says, isn't heading towards some end point, certainly not that of a federal state. He describes it as a living entity, one that must change depending on the challenge.
The EU's attempts to gain legitimacy through a steady drumbeat of new reforms – the proclamation of a leading candidate in the election for the European Parliament, for example, or the strengthening of European Parliament – miss the mark, he believes. "Surviving in crisis is what gives Europe its legitimacy," he says.
But Brussels isn't capable of that on its own. Aligning policy with community resilience requires an understanding of your own society, Krastev says. From the perspective of Brussels, this isn't possible because there is no European society. "There are highly intelligent people sitting in Brussels who see everything in terms of costs and benefits," he says.
Krastev is convinced that psychological factors are important in politics in terms of leaders and society. But politics in Brussels is depersonalized, he says. "With all due respect: Who wants to write a book about the mind of Ursula von der Leyen?"’

Read the article here.

So, what do we have here?

Cuperus accuses the Germans of having a World War II trauma, but is fearful of a too powerful Germany.
It’s unclear who might turn end to be the bigger threat, Trump or Putin?

The main argument against the US as military defender of Europe is the possibility that the US might not want to fulfil this task anymore. Not a very strong argument.

The sovereignty of the individual state in Western Europa has been an illusion for a long time. I’ve argued this before. True, some people love this illusion. Politics based on the love for illusions is part of democracy, but the illusion remains an illusion.

The EU, as many other institutions, will only change under the threat of war or a severe crisis. Whether this make this war worth your while is doubtful.
Also, a stronger military in Europe without significant process towards a more united Europe will turn out to be a disaster.