On Obama for a change and on the war– Alon Pinkas in Haaretz:

‘In March 2014, a few days after the Russian invasion of Crimea, Barack Obama said Russia was nothing more than “a regional power” whose actions in Ukraine (back then) reflected “weakness rather than strength.” The U.S. president was lambasted for dismissing the threat of Russia’s formidable military and for not crafting a counter-Russia policy. But Obama was right.
In April that year, Sen. John McCain quipped on late-night TV that “Russia is a gas station masquerading as a country,” a sentence later embellished to “a gas station with nuclear weapons.” McCain, who would die in 2018, was right.
Eight years later, the man proving both Obama and McCain right is, ironically, Vladimir Putin.’

(…)

‘In seven months, Russia transitioned from delusions of grandeur of “launching another czarist empire” and “restoring the Soviet Union's hegemony” to being a huge but, yes, second-rate power. Proud and patriotic Russians have one man to thank for this feat: Vladimir Putin and the kleptrocracy he turned Russia into.
Stunning Ukrainian military successes in the last week have upended conventional analyses. The new analyses may border on hyperbole, describing Kyiv's successes as “an inflection point” and “the turning of the tide,” with some going as far as predicting a comprehensive Ukrainian victory. The latest edition of The Economist ceremoniously proclaims on its cover: “Getting the Job Done,” right above some clickbait-worthy advice: “How Ukraine can win.”’

(…)

‘All this somehow misses the point. Ukraine has already won. Ukraine moved from a tenacious defense to local tactical successes to theater-scale achievements. Despite the abysmal performance of the Russian military, this should not be downplayed. Even if the Russians can't be entirely driven out of the Donbas – Donetsk and Luhansk – and the Crimean Peninsula, on the strategic level Russia has already been defeated, resoundingly.’

(…)

‘Thanks to China and a few other countries, Russia has found ways to sell oil despite the sanctions, but otherwise it has become a pariah state.’ (…)

‘The intelligence failure was just as bad. Expecting Ukrainian incursions in the Kherson area in the south, Russia was surprised in August and September by a major Ukrainian offensive in the northeast near Kharkiv. That offensive took back almost all the territory Russian seized at the beginning, maybe more.
Once the first Russian line of defense was breached, Ukrainian, American and British intelligence realized that there were no second and third lines, just artillery batteries, some destroyed by the newly supplied American M142 HIMARS: the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. The retreat from northeastern Ukraine exposes a vulnerable Russia in the south and in the eastern Donbas. Those two regions were Putin’s clearly defined objectives, so now we have the dramatic analyses of a possible total Russian defeat.’

(…)
‘Twenty years of Western infatuation with the allegedly brilliant Russian concept of hybrid war has had to be revisited. This isn't because Russia lacks the technology or military thinkers, but because of a much more rudimentary fact: Corrupt kleptocracies debilitate every organization and process. The military is no exception.
So what comes next? Despite Ukraine's impressive accomplishments, it's irresponsibly premature to guess where the war is going. Putin may seek a stalemate ahead of a cease-fire and hope to negotiate. But that would be tantamount to admitting defeat.’

(…)

‘Desperately needing a winning narrative – with his hold on power also becoming an issue – he may opt to use tactical nuclear weapons. But against whom and what? Ukrainian forces haven't bunched themselves up, which leaves Ukraine’s cities. The use of nuclear weapons would cost Russia dearly – nor is it a given that the Russian military would obey such an order.
Assuming that none of these options is attractive, Putin may choose to absorb the setbacks, reorganize the military and wait it out, hoping to deprive Ukraine of further successes.
In Washington and European capitals, the issue of “What will Putin do” is both concerning and perplexing. There's no doubt that the war will have far-reaching implications on Russia. It will consolidate its second-rate status, weaken Putin internally, ensure that Beijing is the senior partner in the axis and erode Russian diplomatic clout in Europe, with a potential encroaching on Russian influence in the Caucasus. If this is clear to Putin, his unpredictability in the near term increases.’

(…)

‘U.S. intelligence estimated this week that Russia invested $300 million in sabotaging political parties and elections in “at least two dozen” countries. This is a unique opportunity to crush Putinism an seize the moment. A Putin left to negotiate is a Putin who will do this all again in five years.
Russia has never been as great, advanced and formidable as it perceives itself to be, but it has never been as weak, decrepit and inconsequential as some of its detractors and enemies describe it.’

Read the complete article here.

Yes, Ukraine (and NATO for that matter) has already won.

China is the senior partner, and Xi is much more formidable enemy than Putin. A Russia that is too weak is not in the interest of the West.

It’s always hard to believe that the enemy might not follow the logic of what appears to be its best interest, see Wold War II and the problems of understanding the Führer. Well, we understood him when it was too late.

Putin is not Hitler, I rejected the comparison in February and I still do. He is a dictator, a warmonger, a man who frivolously sheds blood, of its own and other citizens, a man who silences, tortures if necessary and kills his political enemies but you can be all these things without being Hitler.

I don’t think Putin is interested in crossing NATO’s red lines. Also, I don’t think that NATO is interested in crossing Putin’s red lines. Those who think that Putin is ready to take his life in the bunker while the American army is closing in on Moscow, dream on.
Also: whatever we mean by Ukrainian victory, the problems will not end there, the problems will begin there.
Which is not too say that I’m in favor of this victory.