On the war - Alon Pinkas in Haaretz:

‘Seventy two hours. Three days. That was the initial Western assessment before Ukraine either capitulated or suffered a rout by a mighty, modern, inventive, highly technological, well-trained and superbly commanded Russian army. It's a year later and Moscow’s military debacles and colossal strategic mistakes can fill books.’

(…)

‘But it was just like 1992. Back then, after the Soviet Union disintegrated, analysts got to see up close what they had perceived as a state-of-the-art, invincible Red Army. Instead, it was a rusty, derelict, under-trained force. In 2022, the same type of analysts were surprised once the Ukraine invasion unraveled. Just go back to the glossy, intimidating “Soviet Military Power” booklet that the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency put out annually.’

(…)

‘It was never about NATO. It was and remains all about Putin’s delusions of grandeur. But one strategic aspect did evolve over the past year: What began as a Russian-Ukrainian war expanded into a Russia-U.S./NATO indirect conflict, with Ukraine’s resilience supported by Western arms and intelligence.’

(…)

‘First, there was Putin’s confidence that Ukraine would be rattled by the mere threat of an invasion. Its military would surrender quickly and Volodymyr Zelenskyy's government would flee, with Russia installing a pro-Russian puppet government and effectively re-annexing Ukraine. This was proved all wrong.
Second, there was a presumptuous and gross misjudgment of Joe Biden’s resolve and resilience to counter Russia. For a long time Putin wrote extensively about the decline of a decadent and decaying West. The United States, devoid of values, was in decline, weak, tired of managing the world order and paying the price for hegemony in Europe and elsewhere.’ (…)

‘Putin was entirely wrong. After a years-long identity crisis and a lack of a clear mission statement, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine infused new life and rigor. All of a sudden, NATO had a raison d’être, a clear adversary and a well-framed security challenge. Putin essentially rebuilt NATO. Not only has the alliance not been diminished by internal contradictions, it has expanded and strengthened with the (eventual) accession of Finland and Sweden.
In fact, look at Putin’s dire accomplishment: He turned the Baltic Sea into an anti-Russian lake. Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are all NATO members, as are the Bucharest Nine: nine Eastern European countries, all former members of the Warsaw Pact.’

(…)

‘A year later, what began as a comprehensive invasion was degraded to an artillery war of attrition. If you compare the two countries along conventional criteria – casualties (civilian and military), territory ceded, infrastructure damage, economic devastation – obviously Ukraine is suffering while Russia has the depth and resources. But if you compare the intentions a year ago to the reality today, Russia has been defeated.’

(…)

‘Seventh, China. This is perhaps the most consequential result of the war at this point. Three weeks before the invasion, ahead of the Winter Olympics in Beijing, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin stood side by side with huge Chinese and Russian flags almost enveloping them, and pledged “friendship with no limits.” China saw Russian pressure on Ukraine as part of an effort to restructure the “American order” that has girded the world since 1945. China sees itself as a superpower constricted by unfair American hegemony.
But China had hoped that Moscow would scare Ukraine into capitulation without a war, similar to what Beijing might have in mind for Taiwan. The invasion surprised Xi, but Russia’s military and diplomatic performance dejected him, so China stayed away, lending only verbal support and buying oil.
Now, according to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, China plans to supply Russia with advanced weapons. The United States may divulge details in the coming days, but the strategic implication for Russia is harsh: an upending of the power relationship, with China the senior partner and Russia the weaker client.’

(…)

‘The war isn’t over by any stretch and both Russia and Ukraine seem to be gearing up for an escalation. But one year later, however the war ends, Putin has lost.’

Read the article here.

Russia became China’s weaker client.
Putin managed to unite Ukraine, for the time being, to awaken NATO (it’s not braindead, it has a purpose), to strengthen America’s imperial ambitions. No imperium can afford to be tired.

And what I wrote twenty years and ten years ago is still accurate, those who believe that the end of the American empire will bring us under the influence of a better empire are mistaken.

Pinkas doesn’t write about the possibility that Russia will disintegrate. But Biden is walking on a thin cord, Ukraine needs to ‘win’ -but Russia needs to remain intact.
Biden will have to display the prudence of Bush père during and after the first Gulf War.
Of course, after that war came Iraq 2003. And after Iraq and Afghanistan came neo-isolationism. We will leave Syria to its own devices. Understandable, Obama’s decision is still defendable. But maybe a bit unfortunate for Syria?

Is Putin the new Saddam? That’s the question.