On the day after - Zvi Bar'el in Haaretz:

‘The Qatari prime minister squirmed. Asked if his country would no longer host Hamas leadership on its territory or cut ties with the organization, he replied: “Right now, we are focused on keeping open channels of communication and ending this conflict.” The “open channels of communication” between Qatar and Hamas is currently almost the only hope for even negotiating to release the hostages. This channel relies on years of Qatari aid and support for Hamas, which began long before Israel allowed Doha to transfer funds to the Hamas government in Gaza.’

(…)

‘It is perhaps premature to ask what will happen to the Qatar-Hamas relationship after the war, when this relationship is continuing with full force. This is even more of an open question, given that the current working assumption is that the terrorist organization will cease to exist as a military and political entity in the Gaza Strip when the war is over.
But Hamas is no mere terrorist squad whose elimination removes the threat. It has military and political infrastructure in Lebanon, investment companies in Turkey, and a representative office in Malaysia, where its personnel have undergone training. The resumption of ties between Hamas and Syria, which were severed in 2012 following the Assad regime’s massacre of hundreds of thousands of civilians, has opened up a further option for the organization to re-establish itself.’

(…)

‘Another question is how Turkey will act; Ankara agreed to expel the Hamas leadership from its territory as part of its renewal of relations with Israel, but there are still Hamas representatives in the country who received Turkish citizenship. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s recent statement that Hamas is not a terrorist organization but a political party that won the 2006 elections may be an indication of his intentions.
Turkey and Qatar are more sensitive to American sanctions than any other country that supports Hamas. Another point is that Erdogan is not implementing the sanctions the U.S. imposed on Russia over the war in Ukraine, and has bypassed sanctions on Iran in the past. Qatar, like all the Gulf states, is not implementing the U.S. sanctions on Moscow.
The fact that it hosts the largest American base in the Middle East, its huge investment portfolio in the United States and Western countries in general, and its being one of Europe’s most important gas suppliers could serve as a check against sanctions.
The immediate question is whether the U.S. will be willing or able to take the step of relocating its military base in Qatar to another country if Doha persists in providing shelter to Hamas’ leadership.’

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‘We should recall that Marwan Barghouti, who is held in an Israeli jail and is considered the natural candidate to lead the PLO and head the PA after Mahmoud Abbas, is very close to Hamas. Seven years ago, he even drafted a strategic document for political cooperation with Hamas. Hamas, in turn, has always demanded Barghouti’s release in any prisoner deal and may even subordinate itself to his leadership.’

Read the article here.

In other words, even if Israel might destroy all the military capabilities of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza the movement will not cease to exist.

Nobody should harbor the illusion that the PA with the help of Israeli tanks will return to power in Gaza.

Apparently, some think that Mr. Barghouti will be the new leader of the movement that might or might not be called Hamas.

And Hezbollah has no interest in a competitor in Lebanon. Hamas should stay in Gaza, according to Hezbollah.

We will see what realpolitik is going to deliver.