Isaac Chotiner talking to M. Taylor Fravel in The New Yorker:

‘To talk about China’s military strategy, and the future of U.S.-China relations, I recently spoke by phone with M. Taylor Fravel, a professor of political science at M.I.T. and the director of its Security Studies Program. He is also the author of “Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy Since 1949.” During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed how China has modernized its military during the past twenty-five years, how Xi has taken control of military policy, and why the diplomatic fallout from the balloon incident may be much more dangerous than the usual spy games.
There has been a lot of analysis indicating that Xi has brought about a new era in Chinese politics. Has China also entered a new military era? In the past decade, the Chinese military has definitely entered a new era, but it reflects a series of decisions made earlier. In the late nineties, in the aftermath of the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy [in Belgrade], during the air war there, a decision was made to modernize the Chinese military and completely reinvest in all platforms, across all systems. That kicked off well before Xi Jinping became General Secretary and chairman of the Central Military Commission. That dedication to building a modern military preceded Xi, but it has manifested on Xi’s watch, so to speak. We’re seeing how the ground forces, the rocket forces, the Navy, the Air Force, etc., are now, by and large, field-modern, capable platforms that simply didn’t exist two decades ago.’

(…)

‘Well, we’ve talked for more than twenty minutes now without mentioning this balloon, and that was intentional, but— Good.
I should just ask what you’ve made of this story.
Intelligence collection and surveillance is something that states do, but usually when they’re over another country they do it from outer space, from satellites, and not from something that would violate national airspace, as this balloon did. I was struck by the fact that China did conduct a surveillance-and-reconnaissance operation, or some other kind of intelligence-gathering operation, over American airspace, because of the implications that it would have for U.S. perceptions of China and China’s future intentions. We all know that surveillance is going on overhead by satellite. There’s no surprise there. We all know that countries spy on each other. The spying itself is not a surprise.
But what was really was surprising, or what caused me to scratch my head, is: wow, that is violating the principle of sovereignty that underpins so much of China’s security concerns in East Asia, whether it’s Taiwan, the South China Sea, American navigation operations in the South China Sea, and so forth. No. 2, my gut instinct was that this was no doubt part of a potentially long-standing Chinese intelligence-collection program, but that the program itself was probably very poorly coördinated, perhaps not just within the P.L.A. but between the P.L.A. and other parts of the Party state.
That poor coördination probably extends to the Foreign Ministry, and essentially the senior leadership, in that it’s not clear to me that Xi Jinping would’ve wanted this balloon to fly over the United States at precisely the moment when he was seeking to lower the temperature in ties with the United States, which would’ve taken place had Secretary of State Blinken gone ahead with his visit. Although we don’t know, because China has not been terribly transparent about this, the incident seems to reflect these coördination problems one has in large bureaucracies. China’s certainly not immune to that problem, like so many other states.’

(…)

‘How do you view the American response to China’s military modernization? Depending on who you talk to, China is either the pacing challenge or the pacing threat. It’s the country around which, at least in principle, U.S. modernization and plans are being oriented. What that means is that there’s going to be a much greater focus on competing with China in the military domain, to maximize U.S. leverage and minimize U.S. vulnerability. But, of course, China has a say in how it responds to the actions that the United States is taking in response to Chinese modernization. It will almost certainly seek to offset those, which means that, in the military domain, you’re quite likely to see a greater spiral of tensions and instability, which runs the risk of a real crisis between the two countries. If you look at how a balloon was handled, one has to ask: How are the two countries prepared to handle an actual military fight?’

Read the interview here.

I’m not sure if the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was so accidental, but alas.

Also, the balloon was clumsiness.

Spying is okay.
Balloons not okay.

The contacts between China and the US are dysfunctional, I would say a case of negligence.

Contacts between Putin and Biden are probably less dysfunctional. Given all the dangers that exist because of Ukraine. Most mutual red lines appear to have been respected, till now.
.