On the other animals – Raffael Fasel in TLS:
‘In Justice for Animals: Our collective responsibility, Martha C. Nussbaum presents perhaps the most powerful philosophical case to date for why we should correct our perspective and bring the interests of all sentient animals into the picture. The position for which she argues is called the “Capabilities Approach”, a moral and political view that recognizes all sentient animals as ends in themselves and demands that they be protected simply by virtue of being creatures who strive to flourish. All animals, whether human or not, want to live good lives. Animals enjoy such lives only if they are free from pain and premature death, with adequate shelter, health and food, and only if they can express themselves in positive ways: by having meaningful social interactions, enjoying their senses and imagination, playing, shaping their environment and even having opportunities for sexual satisfaction. All animals have these central capabilities, and they come with entitlements, comparable to fundamental rights. But while all sentient animals have these entitlements in common, each species has its own way of flourishing. A good life for a koala (a notoriously solitary species) requires fewer opportunities to mingle than a good life for an African elephant, who lives in groups of ten or more. A just society does not need to ensure that every sentient individual fulfils their potential; but it does need to put in place laws and policies guaranteeing that no one slips under the threshold below which a dignified life becomes impossible.’
(…)
‘Nussbaum might have profitably explored more radical developments, including the cases from Argentina and Ecuador in which a chimpanzee and a woolly monkey, respectively, were recognized as legal persons with fundamental rights. Both cases were the result of habeas corpus petitions, or lawsuits requesting judicial scrutiny of an autonomous animal’s captivity. But Nussbaum implicitly dismisses such petitions. According to her, lawyers who file them, such as Steven Wise, are guilty of the “So Like Us” approach, which predicates the protection of animal species on their similarity to human beings. But there is a difference between valuing similarity as such and valuing properties such as autonomy that the law protects in humans, which is what Wise is actually doing. More fundamentally, though, Nussbaum misses an opportunity to investigate what it takes to turn the “virtual constitution” into a real one; that is, how an ethical theory like hers can be translated into law.’
(…)
‘This said, Martha C. Nussbaum’s work is an important contribution to an urgent issue of justice that challenges readers to question their own lifestyles.’
Read the article here.
In theory Nussbaum is right. We can ask where the ‘sentient’ animal ends? Bacteria? Insects? But that doesn’t mean of course that she is nogh right.
Practically it seems to be impossible to organize solidarity between human beings on a large and even on a not so large scale.
But maybe it’s easier to organize solidarity between men and dogs than between men and men. Dogs are slightly less disappointing I have been told.
Often humans have nasty things to say about mankind, most often are these statements based on morality.
Other animals appear to be morally superior. Whether this is because they lack the power and possibilities (technology) remains a question.
But it can be a source of hope and maybe even pride that no rabbit or monkey invented the guillotine, in order to kill more humanely.